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This paper examines the implications of alternative allowance allocation designs under a federal cap-and-trade
program to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.  We focus on the impacts on industry profits and
overall economic output, employing a dynamic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy.  The
model’s unique treatment of capital dynamics permits close attention to profit impacts.
We find that the effects on profits depend critically on the method of allowance allocation.  Freely
allocating fewer than 15 percent of the emissions allowances generally suffices to prevent profit losses
among the eight industries that, without free allowances or other compensation, would suffer the largest
percentage losses of profit.  Freely allocating 100 percent of the allowances substantially overcompensates
these industries, in many cases causing more than a doubling of profits.
 
These results indicate that profit preservation is consistent with substantial use of auctioning and the
generation of considerable auction revenue.  GDP costs of cap and trade depend critically on how
such revenues are used.  When these revenues are employed to finance cuts in marginal income tax
rates, the resulting GDP costs are about 33 percent lower than when all allowances are freely allocated
and no auction revenue is generated.  On the other hand, when auction proceeds are returned to the
economy in lump-sum fashion (for example, as rebate checks to households), the potential cost-advantages
of auctioning are not realized.
 
Our results are robust to cap-and-trade policies that differ according to policy stringency, the availability
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
  Cap and trade has emerged as the centerpiece of discussions of potential federal-level 
climate-change policies.  Within discussions of alternative cap-and-trade programs, there has 
been an intense focus on the issue of how emissions allowances might be allocated and how 
the revenues from an allowance auction (if any) might be used.  What fraction of the 
allowances should be auctioned out, as opposed to given out free?  How much free allocation 
would be sufficient to preserve profits in various industries?  What are the economy-wide 
implications of alternative uses of whatever auction revenues are collected? 
 
  Despite considerable and sometimes contentious debate on these issues, there have 
been very few quantitative analyses of industry profit impacts and associated GDP 
consequences under a range of allocation methods.
1  One reason is that many of the leading 
models employed to investigate cap-and-trade policy, while offering many very important 
and policy-relevant insights, are not well suited to examining potential impacts on profits.  
Some of the models
2 assume that physical capital is perfectly mobile across the economy, 
which means that capital can instantly flow out of one sector and into another in response to 
a change in economic conditions.  This precludes an assessment of the differential profit 
impacts across industries, since it eliminates the possibility of stranded assets and instead 
implies that capital in all sectors instantly reachieves the same productivity following a 
policy intervention. 
 
  Other models adopt a “putty-clay” approach to capital dynamics, according to which 
capital is completely immobile once it is installed.
3  This approach may exaggerate the 
problem of stranded assets, since it does not allow for any removal or sale of previously 
installed capital; capital stocks can only decline through physical depreciation.  Thus, the 
coal mining industry, for example, would be prevented from significantly reducing its 
equipment as part of its effort to respond to reduced coal demand resulting from a cap-and-
trade program.   
 
  The present study offers results from a numerical general equilibrium model of the 
U.S. economy that is uniquely well-suited to assessing the profit impacts across various 
                                                      
1 Burtraw and Palmer (2002) investigated the implications of alternative allocation methods for profits and asset 
values in the HAIKU model, which focuses on the electricity sector.  Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and Smith, 
Ross, and Montgomery (2002) considered alternative allocations using general equilibrium models with a 
relatively primitive treatment of cap and trade, as discussed below.  See Ramseur (2008) for a review of existing 
studies of the impacts of alternative allowance allocation designs.  
 
2 The IGEM model developed by Dale Jorgenson and his collaborators assumes perfectly mobile capital.  
Details on this model are contained in Goettle et al. (2007).  
 
3 The ADAGE model and MIT EPPA model adopt a putty-clay treatment for capital, as does the model of 
Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002).  The ADAGE model is described in Ross (2007); the EPPA model is 
documented in Paltsev et al. (2005).  See Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) for details on their model. 
 industries under possible cap-and-trade program designs.  In contrast with other models
4, it 
derives both investment and disinvestment behavior from optimizing decisions at the 
industry level.  Forward-looking managers in each industry make investment decisions that 
take into account the adjustment costs associated with both the installation and removal of 
productive capital.   
 
  This approach permits a close examination of how profits are affected in various 
industries under a range of allocation approaches.  As discussed below, the impacts differ 
dramatically depending on the extent to which auctioning or free allocation is employed.  
When a firm must purchase all of its allowances (as is the case when all allowances are 
auctioned) the potential policy-generated rents (or, equivalently, the value of emissions 
allowances) are transferred from the firm to the government.  In contrast, when a firm 
receives allowances free, it retains these rents.  This makes an enormous difference.  Indeed, 
it generally determines whether cap and trade causes a reduction (the 100 percent auction 
case) or an increase (the 100 percent free allocation case) in the firm’s profit. 
 
  This paper applies the model to assess how policy impacts differ across various types 
of emissions allowance allocation.  We consider policies that vary in terms of both the 
reliance on free versus auctioned allowances and the use of revenues from allowance 
auctioning (if applicable).  These alternatives are evaluated under programs that differ in 
terms of policy stringency (the total number of allowance put in circulation), the points of 
regulation, the availability of offset programs, and the possibility of intertemporal banking or 
borrowing of allowances.  These are central considerations in current policy discussions, 
including the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act passed recently by the U.S. 
House of Representatives.   
 
  We find that freely allocating a relatively small fraction of the emissions allowances 
generally suffices to prevent profit losses among the eight industries that, without free 
allowances or other compensation, would suffer the largest relative losses of profit.  Under a 
wide range of cap-and-trade designs, freely allocating less than 15 percent of the total 
allowances prevents profit losses to these eight most vulnerable industries.  Freely allocating 
100 percent of the allowances substantially overcompensates these industries, in many cases 
leading to profit increases of over 100 percent. 
 
  These results indicate that profit-preservation is consistent with auctioning the lion’s 
share of allowances.  One important potential use of auction revenues is to finance reductions 
in the marginal tax rates of ordinary, distortionary taxes such as income, sales, and payroll 
taxes.  This is important for the GDP and efficiency costs of cap and trade.  When just 
enough free allocation is offered to compensate (but not overly compensate) the most 
vulnerable industries, considerable auction revenue is generated, yielding significant 
opportunities to avoid distortionary taxation.  Our numerical simulations indicate that when 
                                                      
4 To our knowledge, the only other multisector general equilibrium U.S. economy model incorporating 
optimizing investment decisions at the industry level is that described in Bovenberg and Goulder (2001).  The 
present model extends the earlier model by allowing for a more general treatment of the points of regulation 
(the earlier model could only impose emissions limits on the coal and oil&gas industries) and by allowing for 
various potential cost-saving provisions such as offsets and allowance banking and borrowing.  It also contains 
considerably more disaggregation of industries. 
  2these revenues are used to finance cuts in marginal rates of individual income taxes, the 
resulting GDP costs are about one third lower than in the case where all allowances are freely 
allocated and no auction revenue is generated.  In contrast, the cost-advantages of auctioning 
disappear when the auction proceeds are returned to the economy in lump-sum fashion (for 
example, as rebate checks to households).   
 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 offers a graphical analysis to 
convey how a firm’s profits under a cap-and-trade program are influenced by the way 
allowances are allocated, the emissions-reduction opportunities of the firm, the costs of 
adjusting physical capital, and demand for the firm’s product.  Section 3 describes the 
numerical model used for the quantitative assessments.  Section 4 discusses the model’s data 









  The nature of allowance allocation can make a huge difference to the distribution of 
the burden from regulation, as well as the cost to the overall economy.  Figure 1 helps 
convey the different impacts.
5  Here it is assumed that the points of regulation (the entities 
that must hold and submit allowances) are firms within a competitive industry. 
 
  Consider first the market equilibrium in the absence of regulation.  The initial 
equilibrium price and level of output at the industry level are shown as p0 and X0 , 
respectively.  These are determined by the equilibrium of the original supply and demand 
curves S0 and D. 
 
  Introducing a cap-and-trade system covering emissions from this industry gives firms 
incentives to reduce emissions.  No matter whether allowances are given out free or 
auctioned, each additional unit of emissions has an opportunity cost:  either it obliges the 
firm to purchase an additional allowance, or it reduces the number of surplus allowances that 
the firm can sell.  In general, a firm can accomplish the emissions reductions by changing the 
input mix (for example, switching to less carbon-intensive fuels), installing end-of-pipe 
equipment, or reducing its level of output.  In the figure, it is assumed that the first two 
adjustments raise production costs by  c  per unit of output.  The figure also assumes that the 
cost per unit of remaining emissions – the allowance price multiplied by emissions per unit 
of output – is r.  Thus, the policy drives a wedge of c+r between the consumer price pC and 
the producer price pS.  This implies the new supply curve S1, which in turn implies that 
industry output will be reduced to X1. 
 
 
                                                      
5 For analyses of some of these issues using somewhat different frameworks, see Parry (2003) and Burtraw and 
Palmer (2007). 
  32.1  Auctioned Allowances 
 
  If the allowances are introduced through a competitive auction, the policy will 
generate no rents:  they are bid away through competitive bidding for allowances.  In this 
case, the loss of producer surplus is shaded trapezoid p0 bdpS, while the loss of consumer 
surplus is pC abp0.  The shaded rectangular area pC aef  represents the revenue that the 
government would receive from the allowance auction.  These revenues can benefit 
taxpayers to the extent that they reduce the government’s reliance on other taxes.  
Alternatively, the revenues pC aef  can be used to pay for additional public spending, in 
which case the general public benefits from the goods or services provided. 
  
 
2.2  Freely Allocated Allowances 
 
  If the allowances are introduced through free allocation, the distribution of impacts 
between producers and taxpayers is fundamentally different.  In this case the shaded 
rectangle  pC aef   represents rents to producers rather than revenues to the government.  In 
the figure, these rents are about three times as large as the gross loss of producer surplus (the 
loss before considering the rents) represented by the shaded area p0bdpS .  Thus, in this 




2.3  Combining Auctioning and Free Allocation 
 
  Policy choices are not limited to the cases of 100 percent auctioning and 100 percent 
free allocation:  another option is combining free allocation and auctioning.  For the industry 
depicted in the diagram, industry profits would be preserved if about a third of the 
allowances were given out free, thus enabling the firm to enjoy about a third of the potential 
rents.  The rest of the allowances could be auctioned out.  As indicated below, auctioning 
confers some potential advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
 
  The amount of free allocation necessary to compensate firms for the costs of 
complying with the program depends on the extent to which firms can shift to consumers the 
burden of regulation.  This in turn depends on the elasticity of supply relative to the elasticity 
of demand.  A higher relative elasticity of supply implies a larger pass-through of compliance 
costs into producer prices and a smaller gross loss of producer surplus.  It also implies larger 
potential rents relative to the gross loss of producer surplus, which in turn means that less 
free allocation (or rents to be retained by firms) is needed to maintain profits.  A second 
factor is the extent of required abatement:  at low levels of abatement, permit rents pC aef  are 
large relative to the gross loss of producer surplus p0bdpS, which suggests that relatively few 
free allowances will be needed to preserve profit.  On the other hand, low required abatement 
generally is associated with lower allowance prices, which means that, other things equal, 
more allowances must be freely offered to provide sufficient value to preserve profit.  In the 
numerical model employed in this paper, we vary parameters that relate to each of these 
factors. 
  4 
 
2.4  Trade-offs between Political Feasibility and Cost-Effectiveness 
 
  Free allocation may have attractions in terms of political feasibility.  By allowing 
producers to retain the rents created by the cap-and-trade system, free allocation not only can 
preserve profits but indeed can cause profits to rise.  This protection of profits can help build 
political support from energy-related industries.   
 
  On the other hand, auctioning has a potential advantage over free allocation in terms 
of cost-effectiveness.  Under auctioning, the public sector avails itself of a particularly 
efficient source of revenues – the proceeds from the auction.  The base of the auction revenue 
is inframarginal – it is economic rent – and carries no direct efficiency cost.  In the case of 
free allocation, the government forgoes this efficient source of revenue.  Other things equal, 
the government must instead rely more on ordinary, distortionary taxes (such as income, 
sales, or payroll taxes) to meet its expenditures.  Raising such taxes carries an efficiency cost. 
 
  This suggests a trade-off between enhancing political feasibility (through free 
allocation) and maximizing cost-effectiveness (through auctioning).  The trade-off might not 
be severe, however.  If (as suggested by the graph) profits can be maintained through free 
allocation of a relatively small fraction of the allowances, then a significant amount of 
auctioning is consistent with profit preservation.  In these circumstances the sacrifice of 
potential revenue would be considerably smaller than in the case of 100 percent free 
allocation, and thus the sacrifice of cost-effectiveness need not be large – if the revenues 
from the auction are used to finance cuts in distortionary taxes. 
 
  In the numerical simulations performed for this paper, we explore both the fraction of 
allowances needed to preserve industry profits and the implications of allowance allocation 
for overall economic cost.  This model builds on the graphical analysis by introducing the 
time dimension and allowing for general equilibrium interactions across industries.  
However, the key themes from this simple graphical analysis still apply. 
 
3. The Model 
 
This paper employs an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy 
with international trade.  It generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for 
the U.S. and the rest of the world under specified policy scenarios.  The key agents are 
producers of various goods and services, a representative household, and the government.  
The model captures the interactions among these agents, whose actions generate supplies and 
demands for various commodities and productive factors.  The model solves for all variables 
at yearly intervals beginning in the benchmark year 2005.  We focus on policy impacts 
  5through the year 2030.
6  A detailed description of the structure of the model is in Goulder 
and Hafstead (2009), which is available on request. 
 
The model combines a fairly realistic treatment of the U.S. tax system with a detailed 
representation of energy production and demand.  Details on the tax system are important for 
recognizing the significance of alternative ways to “recycle” auction revenues to the 
economy.  Details on energy production and demand are important for gauging the industry 
impacts of cap and trade, given the major contributions of various energy uses to emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 
 
The model divides U.S. production into the 24 industry categories listed in Table 1.  
This division gives particular attention to energy-related industries, as it identifies separately 
oil and natural gas extraction, coal mining, electricity transmission and distribution, coal-
fired electricity generation, non-coal fossil fuel electricity generation, non-fossil fuel 
electricity generation, petroleum refining, and natural gas distribution.
7  The specification of 
energy supply incorporates the nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural gas and 
the transitions from conventional to backstop fuels.   
 
 
3.1 Producer Behavior 
 
General Specifications.  In each industry, a nested production structure is employed 
with constant-elasticity of substitution (CES) functional forms at each nest.  In all industries 
except the oil and natural gas extraction industry (discussed further below), production 
exhibits constant returns to scale.  Each industry produces a distinct output (X), which is a 
function of the inputs of capital (K), labor (L) an energy composite (E), a non-energy (or 
materials) composite (M), and the level of investment (I)
8: 
( , ( , ( ))) ( ) X  = f  K g L h E,  M   -   I / K  I φ •  (1) 
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the nine energy industries, while the 
materials composite consists of the outputs of the other industries:   
( 11 2 8 , ,..., ab ) E = E x x x x +  (2) 
( 92 ,..., ) 4 M = M x x  (3) 
                                                      
6 Although we focus on outcomes over the next two decades, we need to perform simulations over a longer 
period to generate long-term expectations for the model’s agents, who face infinite planning horizons.  To 
derive the necessary long-term information, under each policy experiment we first calculate steady-state 
(terminal) conditions and then employ those conditions in performing simulations over an interval of 80 years, 
by which time the economic path has converged very close to the steady-state (balanced) growth path. 
 
7 Non-coal fossil fuel generators primarily consist of natural gas fired generators.  Non-fossil fuel generators 
include nuclear, hydro, solar, and wind generators. 
 
8 In each industry, capital (K) is a CES aggregate of structures and equipment. 
 
  6where  i x  is a composite of domestically produced good from industry i and its foreign 
counterpart.
9  Industry indices correspond to those in Table 1.
10 
 
Among economy-wide general equilibrium models, this model is unique in its 
treatment of industry-level investment and capital dynamics.  In each industry, managers 
choose the level of investment to maximize the value of the firm.  The investment decision 
takes account of the adjustment (or installation) costs represented by  / (I K)  I φ i  in equation 
(1).  φ  is a convex function of the rate of investment, I/K, 










=  (4) 
 
where ξ  and δ  are adjustment cost parameters.
11  In particular, δ  is the rate of economic 
depreciation of the capital stock and ξ  is the marginal adjustment cost.  Adjustment costs 
imply that capital is imperfectly mobile across sectors.  As mentioned, this allows the model 
to capture the different impacts of policy interventions on the profits of various industries.  
The law of motion for capital stocks for each industry is given by Ks+1 = (1-δ)Ks + Is. 
 
  Oil&Gas Industry.  The production structure of the oil and gas industry is somewhat 
more complex to account for the nonrenewable nature of oil and gas stocks.  The production 
specification is: 
 
() ( ,(,( ) ) ) X  =  Z f K g L h E, M   -   (I / K  ) I γ φ ••  (5) 
 
where γ  is a decreasing function of Z, the cumulative extraction through the beginning of the 
period.  Through γ  we capture the fact that as reserves are depleted, it becomes more costly 
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where  1 ε and  2 ε  are parameters and Z  is total recoverable reserves (as measured in the 
benchmark year.  Z, the beginning of period cumulative extraction, follows the law of 
motion:   .  In making profit-maximizing extraction decisions, oil and gas 
producers account for the effect of current production on future production costs.   
t t t X Z + +1 Z =
                                                      
9The functions f, g, and h, and the aggregation functions for the composites E, M, and  i x  are CES and exhibit 
constant returns to scale.  
 
10 Indices “1a” and “1b” represent the oil&gas and synfuels industries, respectively.  Only the oil&gas industry 
is shown in Table 1 because synfuels production does not begin until 2025. 
 
11 φ  captures the notion that there is an output loss associated with installing new capital as inputs are diverted 
to install the new capital. 
 
  7 
  The model includes a backstop technology:  the “backstop fuels industry” provides a 
perfect substitute for oil and gas.  As in other industries, in this industry producers choose 
input and investment levels to maximize the equity value of the firm.  The technology for 
producing backstop fuels on a commercial scale is assumed to become known only in the 
year 2025.  We assume that backstop fuels have the same carbon content as oil and gas.
12      
 
  Prices.   All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the domestic 
price of oil and gas, which is given by the exogenously specified world price of oil gross of 
tariffs.  The supply of imported oil and gas is perfectly elastic at the given world price.
13   
 
  Profits and the Value of the Firm.  For a firm in a given industry and given period of 
time, profits can be written as 
 












where τa is the corporate tax rate (or tax rate on profits),  p is the per unit output price net of 
output taxes, w is the wage rate net of indirect labor taxes,  L τ  is rate of the indirect tax on 
labor, EMCOST  is the cost to the firm of energy and materials inputs, i is the gross-of-tax 
interest rate paid by the firm, DEBT is the firm's current debt, TPROP is property tax 
payments, LS is a lump-sum receipt (if applicable) by the firm, DEPL is the current gross 
depletion allowance, and DEPR is the current gross depreciation allowance. TPROP equals 
,1 P Ks s p K τ − , where  P τ  is the property tax rate, pK is the purchase price of a unit of new 
capital, and s is the time period.  Current depletion allowances, DEPL, are a constant fraction 
β of the value of current extraction: DEPL pX β = .  Current depreciation allowances, 
DEPR, can be expressed as  , where  is the depreciable capital stock basis and 
TT K δ
T K
T δ is 
the depreciation rate applied for tax purposes.
14  c denotes the price per ton of carbon 
emissions,  A denotes the economy-wide total allowances (or the aggregate emission cap), 
and 
p
α  represents the share of total allowances given free to the given industry. 
 
  In the presence of a binding aggregate emissions cap,   will be positive.  From the 
firm’s point of view,
c p
A pcα , the total value of the allowances it receives free, is a lump-sum 
                                                      
12 In reality, some potential backstop alternatives (oil shale) have higher carbon content, while other alternatives 
(biofuels) have lower carbon content. 
 
13 As long as imports are the marginal source of supply to the domestic economy, domestic producers of oil and 
gas receive the world price (adjusted for tariffs and taxes) for their own output.  However, rising oil and gas 
prices stimulate investment in backstop fuels.  Eventually, backstop fuels production plus domestic oil and gas 
supply together satisfy all domestic demand, and the domestic oil and gas price is determined by the backstop 
fuels price. 
 
14 For convenience, we assume that the accelerated depreciation schedule can be approximated by a schedule 
involving a constant rate of exponential tax depreciation. 
 
  8payment.  Therefore the receipt of free allowances does not alter marginal costs or returns.  
Thus, free allowances have no direct effect on a firm’s choices of labor, intermediate inputs, 
and investment, although they do raise a firm’s profits.
15 
 
  The firm's sources and uses of revenues are linked through the cash-flow identity: 
 
IEXP   +   DIV   =   VN   +   BN   +   π  (8) 
 
The left-hand side represents the firm's sources of revenues: profits, new debt issue (BN), and 
new share issues (VN).  The uses of revenues on the right-hand side are investment 
expenditure (IEXP) and dividend payments (DIV).  Firms pay dividends equal to a constant 
fraction, a, of profits gross of capital gains on the existing capital stock and net of economic 
depreciation.  They also maintain debt equal to a constant fraction, b, of the value of the 
existing capital stock. Thus: 
 
,, 1 , () s sK s K s s K s s DIV a p p K p K π − ⎡ =+− − ⎣ δ ⎤ ⎦
, 1 )
 (9) 
1, 1 ( s sK s s K s s BN DEBT DEBT b p K p K ++ ≡− = − −  (10) 
Investment expenditure is expressed by: 
 
I   p   )     -   1   (   =   IEXP s  s K, K s τ  (11) 
where τK is the investment tax credit rate. Of the elements in equation (8), new share issues, 
VN, are the residual, making up the difference between π + BN and DIV + IEXP.
16 
 
 Arbitrage  possibilities compel the firm to offer its stockholders a rate of return 
comparable to the rate of interest on alternative assets. 
 
V   i   )     1   (   =   )   VN     V     V (   )       (1   +   DIV   )   -   1 s s b s s 1   +   s v s e τ τ τ − − − − (  (12) 
The parameters τe, τv, and τb are the personal tax rates on dividend income (equity), capital 
gains, and interest income (bonds), respectively.  The return to stockholders consists of the 
current after-tax dividend plus the after-tax capital gain (accrued or realized) on the equity 
value (V) of the firm net of the value of new share issues. This return must be comparable to 
the after-tax return from an investment of the same value at the market rate of interest, i.  
Recursively applying equation (12) subject to the usual transversality condition ruling out 
eternal speculative bubbles yields the following expression for the equity value of the firm: 
 
                                                      
15 As discussed in Section 2, free allowances can affect economic output through their impacts on the 
government’s budget.  The numerical simulations reported in Section 5 indicate that these fiscal impacts have 
some slight effects on firms’ input and output decisions. 
 
16This treatment is consistent with the so-called old view of dividend behavior. For an examination of this and 
alternative specifications, see Poterba and Summers (1985). 
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Equation (13) indicates that the equity value of the firm is the discounted sum of after-tax 
dividends net of new share issues.  In each period, firms choose investment levels as well as 
cost-minimizing inputs of labor and intermediate inputs to maximize this equity value.  
 
 
3.2 Household Behavior 
 
  Household behavior stems from decisions by an infinitely-lived representative agent 
that chooses consumption, leisure, and savings in each period to maximize its intertemporal 
utility subject to its budget constraint.  In year t  the household chooses a path of “full 























) 1 (  (14) 
where ω  is the subjective rate of time preference and   u σ   is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in full consumption.  C is a CES composite of consumption of goods and 













    ⎟ ⎟  (15) 
 
ν  is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure and αC  is an intensity parameter 
for leisure. C
~  is a Cobb-Douglas composite of 17 consumer goods,  i C .
17  In turn, each 
consumer good   i C is a CES composite of domestically and foreign produced goods. At each 
nest in the household’s demand system, the household allocates its expenditure to obtain the 
composite associated with that nest at minimum cost.  Thus, for example, the household 
allocates expenditure between the domestic and foreign produced goods of each type to 
minimize the cost of obtaining the composite  i C .   
 
The household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint given 
by the following condition governing the change in financial wealth, WK: 
 
                                                      
17 Consumer goods are produced by combining outputs from the 25 industries in fixed proportions. 
 
  10t t t t t t t t C p GT YL WK r WK WK
~ ~
1 − + + = − +  (16) 
In the above equation, r  is the average after-tax return on the household's portfolio of 
financial capital, YL is after-tax labor income, GT is transfer income, and  p    is the price 




3.3 The Government Sector 
 
  The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, purchases goods and services 
(the outputs of the 25 industries), and hires labor.  Overall government expenditure is 
exogenous and increases at a constant rate, g, equal to the steady-state growth rate of the 
model.  In the benchmark year, 2005, the government deficit is 1.9 percent of GDP.  In the 
reference (status quo) simulation, the deficit-GDP ratio is approximately constant.  In the 
policy experiments in this paper, we require that the real deficit and real government 
spending follow the same path as in the reference case.  The government’s real tax receipts 
under a policy change thus must be the same as in the reference case.  As discussed below, 
some cap-and-trade systems would tend to raise revenues, while others would sacrifice 
revenue.  In most simulations revenue-neutrality is accomplished entirely through 
adjustments to the marginal rates of individual income taxes.  As discussed below, in some 
simulations lump-sum adjustments to individual taxes also contribute to revenue-neutrality. 
 
 
3.4 Foreign Trade  
 
  Except for oil and gas imports, which are perfect substitutes for domestically 
produced oil and gas, imported intermediate inputs and consumer goods are imperfect 
substitutes for their domestic counterparts.  Import prices are exogenous in foreign currency, 
but the domestic currency price changes with changes in the exchange rate.  Export demands 
are modeled as functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income 
(in foreign currency).  The foreign price is the price in U.S. dollars plus tariffs or subsidies, 
converted to foreign currency through the exchange rate.  We impose the assumption of zero 
trade balance at each period of time.  An exchange rate variable adjusts in each period to 




3.5 Cap-and-Trade Policies 
 
  The model offers a flexible treatment of cap and trade, allowing for alternative 
specifications as to the time-profile of the overall cap, the points of regulation, and the nature 
of allowance distribution. 
 
 The  variable  At (included in equation (7) above) represents the total tons of emissions 
allowed (or total allowances circulated) in period t in sectors covered by the cap-and-trade 
program.  In the absence of offsets or provisions for the banking or borrowing of 
  11allowances,
18 the endogenous price of CO2 emissions allowances,  , adjusts to equate in 




  Points of Regulation.  Cap-and-trade policies can differ according to the points of 
regulation, that is, the entities that must hold and submit allowances to validate the level of 
emissions they generate within a given compliance period.  The model considers both “fully 
upstream” and “modified upstream” policies.  Under a fully upstream policy, allowances are 
required at the entry points for carbon in the economy:  these are the wellhead for oil and 
natural gas producers and the mine mouth for coal, as well as the port of entry for imports of 
these fuels.  Under a modified upstream policy, the points of regulation are various industrial 
entities, at least some of which are further downstream from the initial suppliers of carbon to 
the economy.  While nearly any user of carbon-based fuels could be specified as a point of 
regulation, many recent U.S. cap-and-trade proposals have focused on electric power 
producers, refiners, and various large industrial emitters of CO2 as points of regulation.  
(Section 5 below identifies the industries represented as points of regulation under the 
modified upstream policies examined in this study.) 
 
  Under the fully upstream policy, fossil fuel suppliers must hold and submit emissions 
allowances consistent with the emissions implied by the carbon content of each unit of fuel 
they supply.  This requirement functions like a tax on production.  For these suppliers, the 
producer (or net) price of output,  i p , will reflect the market price of allowances, pc (since the 
allowance price is the opportunity cost of emissions):
19 
  
  0 (1 ) ii i c i p pp c τ =−− 
 
where pi is the gross price of output, τ0i  represents any pre-existing ad valorem output taxes, 
and ci is the carbon content per unit of fuel for the industry in question.  Thus, under the fully 
upstream policy, the price of allowances functions like a per-unit tax on the output of fuel 
producers. 
 
  Under the modified upstream policy, industrial users of carbon must hold and submit 
emissions allowances corresponding to the carbon content of each good they purchase.  In 
this case the cost of emissions allowances is a charge added to the price of carbon-based fuels 
used as inputs to production.  Let pkj represent the price of fossil fuel input k to industry j.  
Then 
 
  (1 ) kj k j c k kj p pd p c τ =+ +  
 
                                                      
18 The modeling of offsets and banking and borrowing is described below. 
 
19 As indicated in Section 2, the opportunity cost of emissions is the same no matter whether the firm receives 
allowances free or must purchase them at an auction. 
  12where  pk is the pre-tax price of fuel k,  kj τ  represents any pre-existing intermediate input 
taxes on fuel k used by industry j, and dj  is a dummy variable that equals one if industry j is a 
point of regulation and zero otherwise. 
 
   Allowance Allocation.  The model can consider any combination of auctioning and 
free allocation of allowances, including the limiting cases of 100 percent auctioning and 100 
percent free allocation.  In addition, it is flexible as to how the free allowances are allocated 
across various industries.   
 
  Recall from equation (7) in subsection 3.1 above that αiA is the number of 
allowances allocated freely to industry i (in a given time period).   Producers can use these 
emissions allowances themselves or sell them at the market price to other industries covered 
under the cap.  Equation (7) indicates that from the firm’s point of view, allowances received 
free are a lump-sum transfer:  they do not affect firms’ marginal costs of production.  Thus, 
free allocation has no direct effect on firms’ pricing or output decisions.
20 
   
  Banking and Borrowing.  Provisions for banking and borrowing allow firms to equate 
marginal abatement costs (in present value) over time, which reduces the present value of 
abatement costs.  Under a system with fully functioning banking and borrowing, in market 
equilibrium the discounted allowance price will be the same in every period within the 
interval where banking and borrowing is allowed.  In simulations of cap-and-trade systems 
involving banking and borrowing, we introduce this condition.  In addition, we relax the 
condition that in any given period, the initial aggregate supply of allowances must 
correspond to aggregate emissions.  We replace this condition with the requirement that the 
cumulative supply of allowances over the interval that allows banking and borrowing must 







  In each period, the following equilibrium conditions must hold: 
 
(1) the aggregate demand for labor equals the aggregate supply; 
(2) the demand for each industry’s output equals its supply; 
(3) the aggregate demand by firms for funds (to finance private investment and 
government borrowing) must equal the total private savings; and 
(4) government expenditure must equal tax revenue less the exogenously specified 
government deficit. 
 
                                                      
20 However, free allocation can affect prices and output by way of impacts on the fiscal system.  These general 
equilibrium effects are discussed in Section 5. 
 
  13  These conditions are met through adjustments in output prices, in the market interest 
rate, and in lump-sum taxes or tax rates.
21  In simulations of cap-and-trade policies, an 
additional condition applies in each period if there is no banking and borrowing:  the 
aggregate demand for allowances (given by aggregate emissions from covered sectors) must 
equal the aggregate supply.  If banking and borrowing is specified, an intertemporal demand-
supply requirement replaces this condition:  cumulative demand for allowances over a 





  Households and firms are forward-looking with perfect foresight.  To solve for such 
an equilibrium, we apply an algorithm similar to that of Fair and Taylor (1983).  This 
approach starts with posited values for “dynamic variables” that embody agents’ 
expectations.  The posited dynamic variables include shadow values for capital in each 
industry and for human wealth.  We solve the model using the posited dynamic variables as 
inputs.  We then compare the values of these dynamic variables with the values of dynamic 
variables that result from the simulation.  If the values do not match, we adjust the posited 
dynamic variables and solve the model again.   We repeat this process until the posited and 
derived dynamic variables match, at which point the model has attained perfect foresight.  
 
4. Data and Parameters 
 
  Complete data and parameter documentation is in Hafstead, Mahoney, and Goulder 




4.1  Data 
 
    Industry input and output flows were obtained primarily from the 2005 input-output 
tables from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
These tables were also the source for consumption, investment, government spending, 
employment, import, and export values by industry.  Data on capital stocks by industry 
derive from BEA tables on the net stock of structures and equipment for each industry, 
except for the four electricity sectors.  The BEA industry capital data do not split out these 
industries.  For these industries we apply data from the Energy Information Administration of 
the U.S. Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
22  
                                                      
21 By Walras’s Law, the required number of equilibrating variables is one less than the number of equilibrium 
conditions.  The numeraire is the nominal wage. 
 
22 Specifically, we calculate the average installation cost (net of depreciation) of 1 MW of nameplate capacity 
by vintage for different generating technologies.  We apply these average historical cost figures to the 
distribution of 2005 generating capacity by generator type and vintage and aggregate by fuel to obtain capital 
stocks for our generation industries.  The residual stocks of structures and equipment implied by BEA 
  14From the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency we obtained data on the energy factors and 
carbon contents of oil, natural gas, and four main types of coal.  From this information we 
derive carbon dioxide emissions per unit of oil, natural gas, and coal used by industry. 
 
 
4.2  Parameters 
 
  Production function elasticities of substitution for the model were derived from 
estimates by Dale Jorgenson and Peter Wilcoxen.  We translated the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen 
estimates of parameters for translog cost functions into elasticities of substitution parameters  
to make them compatible with the CES form of our model.  The capital adjustment cost 
parameters are based on Summers (1981). 
 
  Other important parameters apply to the household side of the model.  The elasticity 
of substitution in consumption between goods and leisure, υ, is set to yield a compensated 
elasticity of labor supply of 0.4.
23 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, 
σ, equals .5.
24 The intensity parameter αC is set to generate a ratio of labor time to the total 
time endowment equal to .44.  These parameters imply a value of 0.19 for the interest 




5.  Results 
 
  Here we present and interpret simulation results from the numerical model.  Cap-and-
trade policies are announced in 2009, and are implemented in 2012.  Because agents are 
forward-looking, policies begin to have impacts at the time of their announcement. 
 
 
5.1  Reference Case 
 
  To analyze cap-and-trade’s impacts, we first perform a reference case simulation.  
This simulation assumes business-as-usual conditions and forms the reference path against 
which we measure the effects of policy shocks. 
 
  In the reference case (as well as the policy cases discussed below), the economy 
reaches a steady state in the long run:  all quantities increase at an annual rate of two percent 
(governed by the exogenously specified rate of labor-augmenting technological change), and 
relative prices do not change.  Two features of the model prevent steady-state or balanced 
                                                                                                                                                                      
aggregates for the electric power industry are assigned to Electric Transmission and Distribution.  Installation 
cost data are obtained from 2005 FERC Form 1.  Year 2005 capacity data are obtained from EIA form EIA-860 
for 2006. 
 
23This lies midway in the range of estimates displayed in the survey by Russek (1996). 
 
24This value falls between the lower estimates from time-series analyses (e.g., Hall, (1988) and the higher ones 
from cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lawrance, (1991)). 
  15growth in the short and medium run along the reference path.  First, the depletion of domestic 
oil and gas reserves implies rising unit costs of domestic oil and gas supply.  In addition, the 
real prices of imported oil and gas are exogenously specified as increasing in real terms.  
These features lead to reductions, over time, in the share of oil and gas consumption relative 
to overall consumption. 
 
  Table 1 shows the levels of real output of each industry in the reference case in 2009, 
in billions of 2005 dollars.   
 
 
5.2  Cap-and-Trade Policies – Central Case Specifications 
 
  The cap-and-trade policies focus on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which 
accounted for 86 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (in CO2 equivalents) in 2007, the 
latest year for which public estimates are available.  The other greenhouse gases are not 
capped.  Figure 2 displays the economy-wide emissions of CO2 that result from the model in 
the reference case and under cap and trade.  The emissions cap requires a reduction in 
emissions of about three percent from 2005 levels by 2012, 17 percent by 2020, and 42 
percent by 2030.  This time-profile of the cap matches that proposed in HR 2454 (Waxman-




Points of Regulation 
 
  The points of regulation represent a key design element of any cap-and-trade system.  
Under a fully upstream policy, the points of regulation are the entry points of CO2 into the 
economy:  the mine mouth for coal and the wellhead for oil and gas, and the port of entry for 
imported fossil fuels.  Most actual policy proposals adopt a different, modified upstream 
approach, in which the points of regulations are slightly further downstream.  Our central 
case involves a modified upstream approach.  The points of regulation are electricity 
generators, petroleum refiners, natural gas pipelines, and some industries that use carbon-
based fuels intensively (chemical and primary metals manufacturers).
26  This roughly 
corresponds to the industries identified as points of regulation in HR 2454.
 27   In subsection 




                                                      
25 After 2030, we allow the cap to increase at the model’s steady-state growth rate of two percent per year, so 
that the ratio of emissions to aggregate output becomes constant in the long run and the model attains balanced 
growth. 
 
26 Coal and oil&gas inputs to the production of the investment good composite (I) are also subject to the 
emissions cap.  See Goulder and Hafstead (2009) for details. 
 
27 The points of regulation in HR 2454 accounted for 85 percent of US greenhouse gas emissions in CO2e terms 
in 2005.  Our modified upstream policy covers 88 percent of US CO2 emissions in the benchmark year of 2005. 
 
  16Allowance Allocation 
 
  We assume that allowances are allocated (either auctioned or given out free) on an 
annual basis.  In our central case, we assume that allowances can only be applied to 
emissions in the year in which they are allocated:  they cannot be banked for use in future 
years, nor can they be borrowed (used in years prior to the year in which they are allocated).  
In subsection 5.4 below we examine impacts when allowance banking is allowed. 
 
  As mentioned above, the relative reliance on auctioning and free allocation, as well as 
the division of free allowances across industries, critically affects the impacts of cap and 
trade on profits of various industries.  Indeed, the choice of allocation method is more critical 
to the incidence across industries of a cap-and-trade system than the choice of points of 
regulation.   
  
  Our central case simulations compare the following allocation approaches: 
 
•  100 Percent Auctioning:  All allowances are auctioned to the industries selected as 
points of regulation. 
 
•  Profit-Preserving Free Allocation:  Some allowances are freely allocated to the eight 
industries that would experience the most significant profit losses under 100 percent 
auctioning.
28  Just enough allowances are freely allocated to these industries to 
preserve the present value of their profits over the interval 2009-2030.  The remaining 
allowances are auctioned. 
 
•  100 Percent Free Allocation:  All allowances are freely allocated to the eight 
industries that would experience the most significant profit losses under 100 percent 
auctioning.  Each industry’s share of the total allowances offered free in each year 
corresponds to its share of the free allowances offered in the case of profit-preserving 
allocation. 
 
  It is worth emphasizing that the potential burden of cap-and-trade policies is not 
confined to the industries selected as points of regulation.  Generally these industries will 
shift some of the burden forward to their customers and backward to their suppliers.
29  Some 
of the industries most vulnerable to cap and trade are outside the points of regulation.  Thus 
the set of industries receiving free allowances in the profit-preserving free allocation case 
includes industries that are not points of regulation.  These additional industries benefit from 
the free allowances by selling their allowances to the industries that are points of regulation.   
 
                                                      
28 We choose the eight industries that under 100 percent auctioning would experience the largest percentage 
reductions in profit over the interval 2009-2030.  We exclude the water utilities industry (which otherwise 
would rank in the top eight) from consideration because of its small size and low emissions relative to the 
others. 
 
29 Indeed, under the assumption of perfect competition and full information, mainstream (non-behavioral) 
economic theory implies that the distribution of the burden of a cap-and-trade system is entirely independent of 
the choice of points of regulation. 
  17 
Revenue Use 
 
  In the absence of the income tax rate adjustments, the 100 percent auctioning case 
and profit-preserving free allocation cases would be revenue-augmenting:  the auction 
revenue they bring in more than compensates for adverse revenue impacts from policy-
induced reductions in the tax base.  In contrast, the 100 percent free allocation case would be 
revenue-losing:  its adverse impact on the tax base is not offset by any auction revenue. 
 
  For the 100 percent auctioning and profit-preserving free allocation cases, we 
consider two alternative ways of achieving revenue-neutrality:  (1) through reductions in 
personal income taxes and (2) via lump-sum tax rebates to households.
30  In the 100 percent 
free allocation case, which generates no auction revenue, revenue-neutrality is achieved 
through (modest) increases in personal tax rates. 
 
 
5.3  Central Case Results 
 
Limiting Cases:  100 Percent Auctioning and 100 Percent Free Allocation 
 
  Table 2 shows the impacts of the cap-and-trade policy on the profits in various 
industries for years 2015 and 2020, for the cases involving 100 percent auctioning and 100  
percent free allocation.  The profit impacts differ dramatically depending on the method of 
allocation. 
 
  Under 100 percent auctioning, the carbon-intensive industries experience significant 
losses of profit.  The magnitudes of these losses are very similar across the two forms of 
revenue-recycling (personal tax rate cuts and lump-sum rebates).  The method of revenue-
recycling affects households’ labor supply, saving and investment decisions.  Although these 
decisions are important for the overall economy, they tend to be spread across all industries 
rather than be concentrated in the carbon-intensive industries.  Thus, the impact on the 
carbon-intensive industries is relatively minor, particularly in the short term.
31  Coal mining 
and coal-fired electricity generation endure the largest losses, in keeping with the high carbon 
intensity of their output (from coal mining) or fuel input (for coal-fired electricity generation.  
Other carbon-intensive industries also experience significant profit losses.  Note that the 
losses of profit are not confined to the points of regulation (electricity generators, petroleum 
refiners, chemical and primary metals producers, and natural gas distributors).  Likewise, 
                                                      
30 The lump-sum tax rebate is set equal to the value of emissions allowances auctioned.  This is in keeping with 
recent proposals, which specify household rebates and other outlays as percentages of the gross value of  
auction revenues, rather than as percentages of auction revenue net of the revenue loss from the reduction in the 
tax base.  To account for tax base impacts and thus achieve overall revenue neutrality, we adjust personal 
income tax rates. 
 
31 In the longer term, the choice of recycling method has a more perceptible impact on industry profits.  
Recycling through cuts in marginal tax rates tends to stimulate investment more than lump-sum recycling does.  
As a result, firms tend to enjoy larger profit increases, or suffer smaller losses, under the former recycling 
method.  
  18some of the points of regulation (in particular, non-fossil electricity generators and other 
fossil generators) experience increased profits under 100 percent auctioning.  Other fossil 
generators are primarily natural gas combined cycle plants.  The cap and trade policy 
stimulates substitution away from coal-fired generation (which is exceptionally carbon-
intensive) toward other forms of electricity generation.  The increased demand for these other 
generation methods underlies the profit increases in these industries. 
 
  Under 100 percent free allocation, the results are very different.  For each of the eight 
industries that would suffer the largest percentage losses without free allocation or other 
compensation, 100 percent free allocation yields increases – and often very large increases – 
in profit.  For coal mining, for example, in 2020 the 35 percent reduction in profit under 100 
percent auctioning converts to a 141 percent increase under 100 percent free allocation.  One 
hundred percent free allocation overcompensates industries by giving them a quantity of 
allowances whose value exceeds the policy-induced gross loss of producer surplus, as 
defined in Section 2.  To preserve profits, the government needs only to offer firms 
allowances whose value corresponds to the portion of the policy burden that producers are 
unable to shift to other industries or to consumers.  One hundred percent free allocation 
grants firms considerably more allowances than this..
32 
 
  Table 3 offers another measure of profit impacts – the percentage change in the 
present value of profits over the interval 2009-2030.  The left pair of columns shows impacts 
under 100% auctioning (with alternative revenue-replacement methods), while the far-right 
column shows impacts under 100 percent free allocation.  The numbers follow a similar 
pattern to that described in Table 2 for the years 2015 and 2020. 
 
Profit-Preserving Free Allocation 
 
  We now examine how much free allocation is necessary to preserve profits (in 
present value, over the interval 2009-2030) in the eight most vulnerable industries.  The 
middle columns of Table 3 indicate the needed free allowances as a percentage of the total 
allowances under the cap and trade system.
33  The coal mining and coal-fired electricity 
generation industries require the largest number of free allowances:  each would need about 
three percent of all the covered emissions (or all the allowances) in the system.  Coal-fired 
electricity generators would receive about 24 percent of their needed allowances free. 
 
                                                      
32 In Phase I of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, more than 95 percent of the emissions 
allowances were freely allocated to firms.  Several interested parties have voiced concerns that this might have 
led to windfall profits.  Ellerman and Joskow (2008) point out, however, that the impact of the EU ETS on 
profits in the electricity sector is difficult to gauge because of coincident changes in natural gas prices as well as 
some countries’ regulations preventing utilities from raising electricity prices in parallel with allowance prices 
(the marginal cost of emissions). 
 
33 Because of general equilibrium interactions, a given industry’s requirement can depend on whether other 
industries are being offered free allowances. The numbers shown are the required allowances when each of the 
eight industries simultaneously receives the needed free allowances.  In other simulations we have calculated 
the required profit-preserving free allocation when free allocation is just offered to one industry.  From such 
simulations the requirements for any industry are very close to those reported for that industry in the table. 
 
  19  The other vulnerable industries require smaller shares of the system’s total 
allowances, and their free allowances represent smaller fractions of their own emissions.  
Importantly, the allowances needed by these industries together total less than 14 percent of 
the cap-and-trade systems allowances.  Thus, these simulations suggest that over 86 percent 
of the allowances could be auctioned out.
34  Table 4 provides a closer look at the relative 
contributions to emissions of the various industries to emissions under the cap and trade 
policy, and the allowances required for profit-preservation, both in levels and as a percentage 
of the economy-wide total. 
 
  The fact that profit-preservation is consistent with auctioning over 86 percent of the 
allowances has important implications for the overall policy costs.  As discussed in Section 2, 
100 percent auctioning has the greatest potential for cost-effectiveness because it enables the 
government to make use of a particularly efficient revenue source – auction proceeds – and 
thus avoid relying as much on distortionary taxes to meet given expenditure requirements.  
To the extent that the government utilizes free allocation, it foregoes the efficient revenue 
source and must rely more on distortionary taxes.  In our simulations, 100 percent auctioning 
enables the government to simultaneously reduce marginal tax rates on labor income by 0.21 
percentage points and on capital income by 0.32 percentage points.  In contrast, 100 percent 
free allocation compels the government to raise these marginal rates by 0.64 percentage 
points and 0.97 percentage points, respectively.
35 
 
  The bottom row of Table 3 reveals the significance of the alternative allocation 
methods for policy costs, here expressed as the reduction, relative to the reference case, in the 
present value of GDP over the interval 2009-2030.  The most cost-effective case is 100 
percent auctioning with auction revenues used to finance cuts in the marginal rates of 
personal income taxes.  In this case, cap and trade has a GDP cost of about 0.57 percent.  The 
least cost-effective cases are those in which no policy-generated revenue is used to finance 
cuts in marginal rates of individual income taxes.  These include the case of 100 percent free 
allocation and the case of 100 percent auctioning, with revenues recycled through lump-sum 
rebates.  In these cases, the GDP costs are very similar – 0.79 and 0.81 percent, respectively 
– and about 65 percent higher than in the most cost-effective case.   
 
  The table also shows the GDP costs in the case of profit-preserving free allocation, 
that is, where just enough allowances (about 14 percent of the total) are given out free to 
preserve profits in the eight most vulnerable industries.  Again the GDP costs depend on the 
method of revenue recycling.  Importantly, preserving profits need not substantially raise the 
GDP costs.  When the revenues from the auction component of this policy are used to 
                                                      
34 HR 2454 provides for limited use of auctioning in the early years of the cap-and-trade system, with roughly 
80 percent of allowances allocated freely to various stakeholders.  Many of these compensation programs phase 
out over 2026-2030, however, with the result that roughly 70 percent of allowances are to be auctioned in 2030 
and later. 
 
35 Another possible use of auction revenues is to finance additional government spending.  Farrow (1999) and 
Parry and Oates (2000) offer analyses of the efficiency implications when environmental policy revenues are 
employed in this way.  Even after auctioning becomes the dominant method of allocation, most auction 
revenues are designated for financing lump-sum rebates rather than reductions in marginal rates. 
   
  20finance marginal income tax rate cuts, the GDP costs are increased by just nine percent 
relative to the most cost-effective case.  The costs in this case are about a third lower than the 
previously mentioned cases involving no marginal rate cuts.  If instead the revenues from the 
auction component are recycled through lump-sum rebates, the GDP costs are very close to 
those of the other cases involving no marginal rate cuts.
36 
 
  Two key messages emerge from these results.  First, relatively little free allocation 
suffices to prevent profit losses in major carbon-supplying and carbon-using industries.  
Second, relative to the most cost-effective case involving no profit-preservation, the added 
GDP cost of preventing profit losses is small, provided that revenues are recycled through 
marginal income tax cuts.  We will see that these results are quite robust to the alternative 
policy designs examined below.   
 
  The finding that relatively few allowances are needed to preserve profits is consistent 
with earlier findings by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and Smith and Ross (2002).  These 
studies considered only upstream cap-and-trade systems and concentrated on preserving 
profits in the coal mining and oil&gas extraction industries.  Bovenberg and Goulder found 
that freely allocating about 10 percent of the allowances sufficed to preserve profits in those 
industries.  Smith and Ross found that 9-21 percent would be sufficient to preserve these 
industries’ profits.   In a subsequent study, Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) claimed 
that considerably higher fractions of allowances must be freely allocated to preserve 
profits.
37   
  
                                                      
36 Employment impacts tend to correlate with the GDP impacts.  In particular, in the cases of 100 percent 
auctioning as well as 100 percent free allocation with revenues recycled lump-sum, cap and trade causes a 
reduction of 0.1 percent in aggregate employment in 2020.  In contrast, under 100 percent auctioning with 
revenues devoted to marginal income tax cuts, there is a slightly positive (0.1 percent) impact on aggregate 
employment. 
 
37 The authors make two main arguments to support the claim that a larger percentage is needed.  One is that 
free allocation must take place over a relatively short period of time, and yet compensate for potential profit 
losses over an infinite time horizon.  Clearly the shorter the time-interval for free allocation relative to the 
interval over which losses are calculated, the larger the required free allocation.  To us it seems most 
informative to use the same interval of time for profit calculations and the free allocation of allowances:  that is, 
to consider the profit losses of some given interval of time, and then to determine how much free allocation, 
within that same time interval, is needed to prevent those profit losses. 
   
   A second argument is that more free allocation is needed once one accounts for the heterogeneity of producers 
within industries.  Consider the case where the cap-and-trade program would increase the profits of some firms 
within an industry that, on average, suffers a profit loss from the policy.  In this case the average loss to the 
“losing” firms exceeds the average loss for the industry as a whole.  Hence greater compensation would indeed 
be needed than what the industry-average profit loss suggests.  Thus, in our analysis, to the extent that some of 
the firms in a losing industry experience profit-increases as a result of cap and trade, our results understate the 
amount of free allocation needed to compensate the losing firms.  However, it is hard to imagine that this issue 
has much empirical significance.  The claimed bias requires that some of the firms in a losing industry actually 
experience profit increases from cap and trade.  Within any of the eight most vulnerable industries we consider, 
one might expect some heterogeneity across firms in the magnitude of profit losses under 100 percent 
auctioning.  But it seems highly doubtful that many or indeed any firms within those industries would enjoy 
increased profits as a result of the cap-and-trade program. 
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5.4  Alternative Program Designs 
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  The cap-and-trade program described thus far excludes several potential cost-
reducing features, such as provisions for offsets and for allowance banking and borrowing –
features included in many recent proposals.






  Several analysts emphasize that cost-effectiveness can be enhanced further through 
provisions for intertemporal trading of allowances – or allowance banking and borrowi
Allowance trading helps promote equality of marginal abatement costs across various 
sources at given points in time.  This helps lower policy costs.  A cost-minimizing firm
would have an incentive to bank an allowance (save it for future use) if it expected its 
marginal abatement costs to be especially high in the future (in present value) relative to its
current abatement costs.  Banking thus allows the firm to substitute relatively inexpensive
current-period abatement for more costly future-period abatement.  Likewise, a firm will 
have an incentive to borrow allowances if its current abatement cos
h
 
  Here we modify the original cap-and-trade program to allow for allowance banking 
and borrowing over the interval 2012-2030.  We require firms to have a zero ba
(t
  
   Figure 3 displays the time-path of emissions in the absence and presence of bankin
borrowing provisions.
41  This path is flatter under banking and borrowing:  emissions fall 
short of annual caps in the short term, and exceed annual caps later on.  Figure 4 compares 
the paths of allowance prices in the central and banking/borrowing scenarios (as well as o
scenarios to be described below).  In the central case, the marginal abatement costs (and 
allowance prices) rise considerably faster than the rate of interest.  This fast-rising pric
 
38 For example, HR 2454 provides for both carbon offsets (to cover up to 2 billion metric tons CO2e of 
emissions each year) and intertemporal banking and borrowing. 
 
39 See, for example, Kling and Rubin (1997) and Leiby and Rubin (2000). 
 
40 In equilibrium, in the presence of banking and borrowing, discounted marginal abatement costs (and thus 
allowance prices) will be equated across time.  Hence allowance prices rise at the rate of interest.  We model 
intertemporal banking by identifying the unique time-profile of allowance prices that meets two conditions:  (1) 
allowance prices rise at the rate of interest, and (2) cumulative emissions over the period 2012-2030 (a function 
of the height of the time-path) match the cumulative emissions allowed by the yearly aggregate caps over this 
time interval. The latter condition assures that firms bring their bank balances to zero by 2030. 
  
41 The figure shows results under 100 percent auctioning of allowances, with revenues devoted to cuts in 
marginal income tax rates.  In fact the emissions impacts under banking and borrowing are very similar under  
other allocation methods or other uses of policy revenues. 
  
  22trajectory stems from the relatively steep decline in the time profile for the aggregate 
emissions caps employed in this study (which is the time-profile under HR 2454).  Under 
these conditions, firms have incentives to bank allowances and thereby avoid the especia
high future abatement costs:  they undertake extra emissions reductions in the near t
(thus, bringing aggregate emissions below the short-term caps) and carry out fewer 
reductions in the future (thus causing aggregate emissions to exceed the longer-term caps).  
These adjustments imply a significantly flatter time-profile for emissions allowance prices
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  Table 5 presents the impacts of alternative allocation methods in the presence and 
absence of the banking provisions.  The lower abatement costs afforded by these provisions 
are reflected in lower GDP costs.  Similarly, in many industries the losses of profit under 1
percent auctioning are smaller.  Correspondingly, in most industries the required value of 
allowances needed to preserve profits is smaller, as indicated in Figure 5a.  At the same time,
providing for banking has a relatively small impact on the numbers of allowances needed to 
prevent profit losses (Table 5 and Figure 5b).  This reflects two offsetting effects.  On the one
hand, the banking provisions imply lower abatement costs which, in the absence of changes
in allowance prices, would imply that fewer allowances are needed to preserve profits
the other hand, these provisions lead to a lower present value of abatement costs a
allowance prices
42, which means that to generate a given value of allowances (or 
compensation), more allowances must be offered.  Because of these offsetting effects, the 






  Here we consider the profit impacts under a modified program in which points of 
regulation are allowed to substitute carbon offsets for an equal number of allowances.  B
purchasing offsets, firms can avoid high emissions abatement costs.
43  Domestic firms 
included among the points of regulation will choose to purchase offsets up to the point w
the price of the marginal offset equals the ma
p
 
  In order to explore the effects of offsets, we introduce a domestic and foreign offse
supply function.  There is great uncertainty as to the costs of offset supply.  Our domestic 
 
42 As seen from Figure 4, allowance prices are higher in the short term but lower in the longer term.  The 
present value of these prices is lower than in the central case, in keeping with the fact that banking reduces the 
present value of abatement costs.  
 
43 Offsets are controversial because of the difficulties of determining “additionality,” that is ascertaining 
whether the emissions reducing or carbon-sequestering activities financed by offset purchases would not have 
taken place in the absence of such financing.  This issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.  We cannot 
claim that the offset scenario is equivalent to other scenarios in terms of CO2 concentrations over the 2009-2030 
interval. 
 
  23supply curve is based on EPA (2005) estimates of potential greenhouse gas abatement in U.S
agriculture and forestry under alternative carbon price regimes.  We assume that the supply
curve for international offsets is the same as that for domestic offsets, and that the supply 
curve is fixed over time.
. 
 
a real (2005$) price of price of $10, 1,124 million tons at $15, 
nd 1,384 million tons at $20. 
nce 
ith 5.0 percent in the central case.  
cluding offsets also reduces GDP costs considerably. 
ent 
  
e Figure 4).  Hence more allowances are needed to 
rovide a given value of compensation. 
 Fully Upstream Program 
ase.  In addition, we designate the same industries 




 rather than only for the six principal carbon-using industries listed in 
bsection 5.2. 
m takes on a smaller share of 
e total effort required to meet the aggregate abatement target. 
                                                     
44  In our smoothly rising offset supply function, the yearly quantity 
supplied is 805 million tons at 
a
 
  Table 5 also displays the impacts of alternative allocation approaches in the prese
of offsets.  As expected, under 100 percent auctioning the profit losses are considerably 
smaller than in the central case.  The average percentage loss of profit for the eight most 
vulnerable industries is about 1.7 percent, as compared w
In
 
  In keeping with the smaller losses of profit, the value of allowances needed to prev
these profit losses is considerably lower when offsets are allowed, as shown n Figure 5a.
However, as indicated in Figure 5b and Table 5, the number of allowances that must be 
freely allocated to preserve profits is higher in this case.  The reason is that offsets 






  Here we consider a fully upstream system:  where the points of regulation are the 
mine mouth for coal, the wellhead for oil and natural gas, and the port of entry for imports of 
these fuels.
45  For comparability, for this case we apply the same time-profile for the 
aggregate emissions cap as in the central c
a
 
  As shown in Table 5, under 100 percent auctioning the profit impacts tend to be 
slightly smaller in this case than in our central case.  For the eight most vulnerable industries
the average profit loss is 4.3 percent, as compared with 5.0 percent in the central case.  The 
difference reflects the fact a fully upstream system allows for somewhat more comprehensive




  GDP costs are also smaller in the fully upstream case.  This too reflects the fact that 




44 Clearly this is a crude approach, but it is partly necessitated by the large uncertainties about international 
offset supply, where economic, administrative, and political factors are both significant and hard to predict. 
 
45 For a discussion of administrative and efficiency issues relevant to the choice between fully upstream,  
modified upstream, and downstream cap-and-trade systems, see Stavins (2007). 
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5.5  Further Sensitivity Analysis 
le 6 indicates how changes in key parameters affect results under the central case 
enario.   
les for 
 
rofit loss, as can be seen from figures 6a and 
b.   More stringent caps also raise GDP costs. 
ity 
 
pact tends to dominate, as higher elasticities are associated with 




nd that the requirements for free allowances for 
ese industries are smaller as well. 
ht most vulnerable industries is below 15 percent.  This total is 
ever above 25 percent. 
.  Conclusions 





  Panels B and C examine the implications of more and less stringent time-profi
the aggregate emissions cap.  Here we increase or decrease in each year the required 
emissions reductions relative to the central case reductions for that year.  More stringent caps
imply larger losses of profit.  However, they also imply higher allowance prices and reduce 
the number of allowances needed to prevent a p
6
 
  Panels D and E reveal the significance of alternative values for the elasticity of 
demand for energy.  The high-elasticity case involves a doubling in each industry of the 
elasticities of substitution between the energy composite E and the materials composite  M, 
as well as the elasticity of substitution between different forms of energy.  The low-elastic
case halves each of these elasticities in each industry.  Higher elasticities are a boon for 
carbon users but a bane for carbon suppliers:  they imply that more of the policy burden can
be shifted from users to suppliers.  The industries in Table 6 are both users and suppliers.  
We find that the former im
sm
 
  Panels F and G consider alternative assumptions for the elasticity of supply.  We 
regulate this elasticity by altering the parameter ξ in the adjustment cost function (equation 
(4) above) for the primary suppliers of carbon – the coal mining and oil and gas industries.  
higher value of ξ  implies higher adjustment costs and a lower elasticity of supply.  This in 
turn implies that the primary suppliers are less able to shift the burden of climate policy to
carbon-using industries downstream.  In Table 6 we find that the carbon-using industries 
suffer smaller losses of profit in this case, a
th
 
  In nearly all of the cases considered in Table 6, the total allowances required to 







  This study applies a numerical general equilibrium model to assess the impacts of 
alternative cap-and-trade policies on profits of U.S. industries and the overall economy.  The 
 
46 However, for the coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation industries, higher elasticities are associated 
with larger requirements for free allowances.  Allowance prices are lower in the high elasticity case, which 
implies that more allowances are needed yield a given value of compensation. 




these most vulnerable industries.  Allocating 100 
ercent of the allowances substantially overcompensates these industries, in many cases 
s.  
 
ction revenue is 








 offers a unique quantitative assessment of the relationship between free 
allocation and profits in U.S. industries, and the implications of such allocation for overall 
economic cost.
e e the profit impacts.   
 
  We find that freely allocating a relatively small fraction of the emissions allowan
generally suffices to prevent profit losses among the eight industries that, without free 
allowances or other compensation, would suffer the largest percentage losses of profit.  
Under a wide range of cap-and-trade designs, freely allocating less than 15 percent of the
total allowances prevents profit losses to 
p
causing more than a doubling of profits. 
 
  The fact that profit preservation requires relatively little free allocation and leaves 
considerable room for auctioning has important implications for economy-wide policy cost
When just enough free allocation is offered to compensate (but not overly compensate) the
most vulnerable industries, considerable auction revenue is generated, yielding significant 
opportunities to avoid distortionary taxation.  In our simulations, when such revenues are 
used to finance cuts in marginal income tax rates, the resulting GDP costs are about one third 
lower than in the case where all allowances are freely allocated and no au
g
savings relative to the case of 100 percent free allocation. 
 
  The finding that a small percentage of free allowances suffices to maintain p
robust, emerging under policy designs that differ according to the presence or absence of 
provisions for offsets or intertemporal banking of allowances, or in terms of policy 
stringency.  It also emerges under more stringent policies that raise policy costs.  When the 
overall cap is tighter, firms need to receive free a higher value of allowances to maintain
profits.  However, greater stringency also leads to higher allowance prices (the value of each
allowance is gre
needed allowance value does not change much with the stringency of cap-and-trade policy. 
  
  It should be recognized that the simulation experiments in this paper consider onl
subset of the provisions contained in recent federal cap-and-trade proposals.  In particular, 
they do not incorporate border-tax adjustments or other forms of industry assistance not 
achieved through free allowance allocation.  These provisions clearly can influence the pr
impacts and economy-wide costs of cap and trade.  Notwithstanding these qualifications, th
present analysis
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X1             X0                 Output   Figure 2: Covered Sector and Economy-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2012-
2030

























All Sectors, Reference Case
Covered Sectors, Reference Case
Covered Sectors, Cap and Trade PolicyFigure 3: Economy-Wide CO2 Emissions with and without Banking/Borrowing,
2012-2030
























Cap−and−Trade Policy, No Banking and Borrowing
Cap−and−Trade Policy with Banking and Borrowing Figure 4: Allowance Prices Under Alternative Policy Designs, 2012-2030



































Fully Upstream SystemFigure 5: Value and Number of Allowances Necessary to Preserve Present Value






















































Central Case Unlimited Banking Offsets Included



















































Central Case Unlimited Banking Offsets Included
(b) Total Quantity (2012-2030) of Freely Allocated AllowancesFigure 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Value and Number of Allowances Necessary to























































Less Stringent Caps Central Case More Stringent Caps



















































Less Stringent Caps Central Case More Stringent Caps
(b) Total Quantity (2012-2030) of Freely Allocated AllowancesTable 1: Net Output* in 2009 by Industry in Reference Case
Pct. of Total
Industry Net Output Net Output
Oil&Gas Extraction 329.6 1.2
Coal Mining 44.9 0.2
Coal Fired Electricity Generation 66.3 0.2
Other Fossil Electricity Generation 55.5 0.2
Non Fossil Electricity Generation 45.0 0.2
Electricity Transmission/Distribution 422.9 1.5
Natural Gas Distribution 153.4 0.5
Petroleum Rening 424.5 1.5
Agriculture 442.6 1.6
Non Coal Mining 57.3 0.2




Wood/Paper Products 434.0 1.5
Chemicals 1177.6 4.1
Primary Metals 266.9 0.9
Machinery 2364.6 8.3





Owner Occupied Housing 2729.8 9.6
Total 28511.4 100.0



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Change in Prots, Value of Allowances Required
for Compensation, and GDP Cost
Coal Fired
Electricity Petroleum Primary
Coal Mining Generation Rening Chemicals Metals
A. Central Case
100% Auctioning* -28.1 -27.7 -4.6 -3.2 -3.5
100% Free Allocation 171.9 170.5 27.5 19.1 20.6
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot** 51.6 52.8 10.6 39.7 12.6
B. More Stringent Caps
100% Auctioning -31.7 -34.1 -6.9 -4.8 -4.6
100% Free Allocation 218.3 236.1 46.5 31.4 30.6
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 64.0 71.4 17.5 63.7 18.2
C. Less Stringent Caps
100% Auctioning -23.8 -20.9 -3.0 -2.1 -2.5
100% Free Allocation 129.4 113.8 15.9 11.2 13.7
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 44.2 40.1 7.0 26.6 9.5
D. Lower Demand Elasticities
100% Auctioning -30.1 -30.6 -6.9 -5.5 -5.2
100% Free Allocation 281.6 287.8 62.3 49.7 47.3
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 79.5 80.5 23.5 97.3 27.5
E. Higher Demand Elasticities
100% Auctioning -19.7 -15.5 -1.9 -0.8 -1.3
100% Free Allocation 58.3 45.9 5.3 2.0 3.5
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 36.4 30.0 3.4 8.8 4.3
F. Higher Adjustment Costs
100% Auctioning -27.9 -27.9 -4.5 -3.2 -3.4
100% Free Allocation 190.2 190.3 29.7 21.0 22.5
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 54.5 52.4 10.3 39.2 12.3
G. Lower Adjustment Costs
100% Auctioning -27.9 -28.2 -4.5 -3.1 -3.4
100% Free Allocation 83.1 86.5 25.4 26.4 30.2
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 27.9 30.2 9.8 52.2 17.4
* Percentage change in the present value of prots over the interval 2009-2030.
** Present Value ($ Billion 2005$) of allowances freely allocated over the interval 2012-2030.Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Change in Prots, Value of Allowances Required
for Compensation, and GDP Cost, Continued
Electric
Transmission & Natural Gas
Railroads Distribution Distribution Total* GDP Cost**
A. Central Case
100% Auctioning*** -2.5 -2.4 -2.8 -5.0 0.47
100% Free Allocation 14.2 14.1 16.1 29.6 0.79
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot**** 10.0 39.9 5.6 222.8 n.a.
B. More Stringent Caps
100% Auctioning -3.0 -3.2 -3.9 -6.4 0.70
100% Free Allocation 19.1 20.8 26.5 42.8 1.13
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 13.1 57.5 9.0 314.4 n.a.
C. Less Stringent Caps
100% Auctioning -2.0 -1.8 -1.9 -3.7 0.31
100% Free Allocation 10.7 9.8 11.0 20.1 0.55
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 8.5 31.5 4.3 171.6 n.a.
D. Lower Demand Elasticities
100% Auctioning -3.8 -1.1 -3.6 -5.6 0.81
100% Free Allocation 33.7 7.9 31.2 51.0 1.27
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 22.0 22.4 10.6 363.2 n.a.
E. Higher Demand Elasticities
100% Auctioning -0.7 -1.2 -1.4 -2.5 0.15
100% Free Allocation 1.7 3.2 3.9 7.0 0.24
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 2.5 19.0 2.4 106.8 n.a.
F. Higher Adjustment Costs
100% Auctioning -2.5 -1.2 -2.8 -4.5 0.47
100% Free Allocation 16.1 6.9 18.0 29.9 0.77
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 10.1 18.3 5.6 202.6 n.a.
G. Lower Adjustment Costs
100% Auctioning -2.5 -1.1 -2.8 -4.4 0.44
100% Free Allocation 25.7 21.6 24.9 29.4 0.75
Value of Allowances Needed to Preserve Prot 16.7 54.9 8.3 217.5 n.a.
* Percentage change in total prots for all industries reported in this table.
** Percentage change in the present value of GDP over the interval 2009-2030.
*** Percentage change in the present value of prots over the interval 2009-2030.
**** Present Value ($ Billion 2005$) of allowances freely allocated over the interval 2012-2030.